'
In some instances, yes. If the U.S. Government believes that a tangible item or information has been exported to another country in violation of U.S. law, then it will investigate to determine how and why the export took place. If it can be shown that you arranged for an unauthorized shipment of an item to another country, then you may be asked to account for your actions. If it is then found that the unauthorized export was unintentional, for instance due to an oversight on your part, or insufficient training or screening practices generally at JHU, then JHU will likely be the only party that will be held accountable and may be subject to a warning or some kind of penalty (e.g., a fine). If, however, it is found that you intentionally shipped an item, knowing that to do so was unauthorized, then you could be incarcerated and/or required to pay criminal fines.
To learn how to develop a comprehensive data management and sharing plan visit…
U.S. export control regulations generally treat Lawful Permanent Residents (people who have “Green Cards”) as though they are American persons. For instance, an Iranian citizen might not be able to access certain devices or technical know-how in one of our labs until she becomes a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States. The same approach would apply if she were lawfully in the U.S. under special protection, such as is offered to those who are allowed to stay in the U.S. as refugees, or those who have been granted asylum.
Please note that there are instances in which the U.S. Government may take an interest in a Lawful Permanent Resident’s prior citizenships, when more highly restricted goods and information are involved.
Fundamental research is considered to be any basic or applied research in science and engineering with results that are ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community (see National Security Decision Directive 189). For those who need definitions of basic research and applied research, we offer the following (taken from an OMB guidance document)
The application of knowledge acquired through basic or applied research to meet specific requirements, such as for the production of useful materials or the deployment of certain systems or methods is not considered fundamental research.
Additionally, in order to qualify as fundamental research, the activity must be conducted free of certain kinds of publication (or other types of dissemination) or access restrictions.
If you are still uncertain whether your activity is fundamental research, please contact the Export Control Office.
Whether or not U.S. export controls apply to your research or other work at JHU depends upon four, primary factors: 1) the subject matter associated with your work, 2) the foreign countries that are likely to be associated with your work, 3) the foreign entities or individuals with which/whom you expect to share certain items or information; and 4) how you reasonably expect those entities/individuals to use what you share with them.
When you carefully and fully answer the Research Compliance Questions that are asked for each proposal that is submitted through Coeus, the Export Control Office has an opportunity to assess whether your project might involve exchanges with foreign parties that would require export licenses. This, however, is not a foolproof way to filter out restricted subject matter, countries, entities/individuals and end-uses from the thousands of proposals submitted yearly through Coeus. We must depend upon a variety of checks and information sources (not to mention training) to help us identify research projects that are impacted by U.S. export controls.
The FAR Clause may apply to personal devices when those devices are used to a significant extent in the performance of a covered contract. The FAR Clause does not apply when a device is “incidental to” the performance of work on a covered contract.
While the FAR Clause does not define what constitutes “significant” or “incidental” use, using a device to occasionally respond to emails about a covered contract does not trigger the prohibition on TikTok.
No, not necessarily. We are usually able to interact with citizens of sanctioned countries when they are lawfully working or studying with us in the United States, although there might still be certain subject matter that we cannot share with them without a license. There are typically more restrictions upon the interactions that we can have with citizens of sanctioned countries when they are in their home countries. Even so…
Some U.S. sanctions programs are more restrictive than others. Your project may involve a country that is subject to a sanctions program but one that does not restrict the kind of transactions into which you will need to enter with its organizations or people. For instance…
Iran is a comprehensively sanctioned country, and the regulations that embody the Iran sanctions program generally forbid any export/import of goods, services or technical know-how to/from that country. There are a few exceptions to this broadly restrictive policy towards Iran, but it is typically quite difficult (if not impossible) for us to involve Iranian entities and individuals in our research, technical assistance and educational activities, if they are not lawfully in the U.S., or if we are unable to procure a license from the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Zimbabwe, on the other hand, is also a sanctioned country, but unlike the Iran sanctions program, the Zimbabwe sanctions program only targets certain entities and individuals and does so in such a limited way as to rarely prevent us from being able to pursue our professional goals in or with Zimbabwean organizations and individuals.
If your research project or other work will involve a sanctioned country, the Export Control Office can help you to determine whether any or all of your proposed activities are forbidden in the absence of a license. If a license is required, we can advise as to whether submitting a license application would be worthwhile, and if it is, we can assist with application drafting and submission.
Remember that it is only the results/findings of fundamental research that are excluded from export controls. It is possible that certain devices, materials or information used in the course of performing fundamental research cannot be shared with foreign persons because they are controlled for export to one or more countries and, in the case of information, it was not the product of fundamental research.
The Export Control Office helps to prevent items and information from going to other countries in violation of U.S. export control and sanction-program regulations. It looks for opportunities to screen items that members of the Hopkins community intend to send outside the U.S. However, it is not responsible for addressing the numerous other issues that you should consider when shipping internationally, including customs (both U.S. and foreign), proper handling and packaging (e.g., hazardous or perishable materials) and insurance. For this reason, we encourage you to visit our international shipping page [link needs to be added], which offers resources that you can use to ensure that your outgoing and incoming international shipments are managed with minimal cost and maximum compliance with the numerous regulations that apply to international shipping.
Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.204-27 (“FAR Clause”), which bans the downloading of TikTok and related apps on certain devices, applies to certain federal contracts. Grants and other non-contract federal awards are not subject to this FAR Clause.
The federal contracts most likely to be subject to the FAR Clause are funded by the Department of Defense and NASA. Other federal funders may require compliance with the FAR Clause on specific contracts, and will notify the university in that case.
The FAR Clause prohibits the use or presence of the TikTop app on information technology (“IT”), including computers and cell phones, used in the performance of a covered contract. The prohibition applies regardless of ownership of the IT, but does not apply to IT that (1) is not used to a “significant extent in” the performance of a covered contract, or (2) is “incidental to” the performance of such a contract.
If you have a question about the applicability of the FAR Clause to a specific contract, please reach out to your grants and contracts associate to discuss further.
Failure to comply with the FAR Clause may result in the loss of the specific contract at issue, debarment from participation in government contract and research programs, and potentially criminal sanctions.
If you have any questions about whether a specific award is subject to the TikTok ban, please contact your grants or contracts associate, JHURA (jhura@jhu.edu) or ORA (ora@jhmi.edu).
Many US funders, both federal and private, now require grantees to provide a data management or sharing plan and to have their data available at the end of funded projects.
As part of NSF’s commitment to enhancing security and safeguarding NSF’s IT systems, user accounts, personal and scientific data, and the integrity of the merit review process, effective on October 27, 2024, the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) is implementing multifactor authentication (MFA) for Research.gov.
An MFA provides an added layer of security and helps to ensure that only authorized users can access Federal resources online.
Beginning on October 27, 2024, external users must first complete a one-time Multifactor Authentication (MFA) enrollment process and use the MFA method to sign into Research.gov.
Additionally, users must:
1. only use their JHED email for login access; and
2. select one of the NSF phishing resistant methods for MFA (multi-factor authentication). MFA methods will be available for selection beginning October 27th.
More information from the NSF can be found here: Dear Colleague Letter: Multifactor Authentication Implementation for Research.gov (nsf25011) | NSF – U.S. National Science Foundation. The NSF will be releasing training information on October 27, 2024.
Questions should be directed to your Grants Associate, while technical questions should be directed to the NSF Helpdesk.
U.S. export control regulations forbid us to take or send certain devices, materials (organic or inorganic), or software to certain other countries, unless we have a license to do so. They also forbid us to release technical information about those items to persons who are in certain other countries and to citizens of those countries, when they are working or studying with us in the U.S. The kind of technical information that the regulations are referring to is that which a person would need to develop, produce or understand (very intimately) the devices, materials and software that are restricted for export. Such information is referred to as “technology” in the Dept. of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (the “EAR”) and as “technical data” in the Dept. of State’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the “ITAR”). The Export Control Office works with academic and administrative units throughout the organization to prevent technology and technical data from being released in violation o
Planning for data sharing during the design phase of a research project can make compliance with these requirements much easier.
Review the below overview designed to inform JHU researchers of the new requirements and things to consider when developing a comprehensive data management and sharing plan. Please note that JHU has an existing policy on data access and retention, as well as rules for the responsible conduct of research., which include requirements for data storage, retention, and ownership.
Individual schools and sponsors may have additional requirements. For more context, read the initial JHU communication on the new data management and sharing policy published on 11/11/22.
These requirements apply to all projects in which data is collected, whether or not the data is derived from human research participants.
U.S. export control regulations forbid us to take or send certain devices, materials (organic or inorganic), or software to certain other countries, unless we have a license to do so. They also forbid us to release technical information about those items to persons who are in certain other countries and to citizens of those countries, when they are working or studying with us in the U.S. The kind of technical information that the regulations are referring to is that which a person would need to develop, produce or understand (very intimately) the devices, materials and software that are restricted for export. Such information is referred to as “technology” in the Dept. of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (the “EAR”) and as “technical data” in the Dept. of State’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the “ITAR”). The Export Control Office works with academic and administrative units throughout the organization to prevent technology and technical data from being released in violation o
To increase the impact and accelerate the pace of scientific discovery.
A visa issued by the United States Government authorizes an individual to study and/or work at JHU, but it does not confer on them a right to access any technology with which our faculty might be working at any given time. As an entity subject to U.S. export control regulations, JHU is responsible for monitoring the tangible items and information that it shares with foreign persons, including those who have visas authorizing them to study and work with us.
The informational results of research that qualifies as “fundamental research” are generally not subject to export controls. What this means is that a JHU research team could lawfully share with their peers at foreign universities new findings about items described on the Commerce Control List – such as certain harmful viruses or bacteria – if the findings arose while performing fundamental research. If the research was not fundamental, perhaps because JHU agreed to the imposition of publication or access restrictions in connection with the project, then, depending upon the countries involved, a license might be needed to share the discoveries with foreign parties.